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INTRODUCTION
The global community just experienced ―the second-worst financial
crisis in the history of the world,‖ and the worst economic collapse in
seventy years.1 Individuals lost homes, jobs, life savings, retirement funds,
children‘s college tuition and more. Not all of these losses were necessary,
and victims of various acts of fraud stemming from the financial crisis are
looking for someone to make them whole.2
One of the most-discussed causes of the financial crisis was the effect of
mortgage-lending practices on the securities market.3 The media has
focused much attention on the failure of regulators to prevent ―predatory
lending‖ in the mortgage market and the victims that succumbed to those
predatory practices, but the general regulatory failure has had more farreaching consequences.4 The impact of the predatory lending was not
confined to the mortgage markets. Many of its effects found its way into
the securities markets in the form of mortgage-backed securities.5
Mortgage-backed securities are financial instruments that are
underwritten by, and derive their value from, rights to payment streams on
1. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Financial Reform Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010,
at A27 (noting the severity of the financial crisis and suggesting options for financial reform
and regulation).
2. See generally Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Mortgage Fraud, Securities
Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those Responsible, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Fraud Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Edward Kaufman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (discussing the need to focus on the role
of financial fraud and how it contributed to the financial crisis in order to hold accountable
those who perpetrated the fraud and prevent future economic collapse).
3. See id. (arguing that the failure of companies to disclose the proper value of
mortgage-backed assets and the possibility that companies made false or misleading
statements regarding the value of those assets significantly contributed to the financial
crisis).
4. See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Eric Dash, Fed Reviews Find Errors in Oversight of
Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at B1 (covering the congressional testimony of former
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairwoman Brooksley Born, who criticized
regulators and blamed them for the devastating economic consequences).
5. Mortgage-backed securities are not a critical part of this Comment, and
understanding their intricacies is largely unimportant here. The impact of these financial
instruments on the securities markets does, however, provide an illustration as to why
private
securities
litigation
is
currently
relevant,
so
a
cursory
understanding is helpful.
Mortgage-backed securities are a type of debt
obligation financial instrument that represent an interest in a mortgage
payment stream. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM‘N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010). The
right to individual payment streams received from housing mortgages are purchased by
some entity (generally a bank), and then ―bundled‖ or ―pooled‖ into one large financial
instrument and used as a form of collateral to create securitized interests in the collective
payments streams (i.e. they are securitized into ―mortgage-backed securities‖). See id. The
mortgage-backed securities are then sold as a form of capitalization and investment just as
any other security. See id.
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mortgages.6 These instruments can become ―toxic‖ where the mortgages
that underwrite the security are high-risk in that the mortgagors are at risk
to default or otherwise disrupt the payment stream on the mortgage. The
toxicity becomes problematic when the securities are held as assets on
companies‘ balance sheets where the value of these assets is either
uncertain or misrepresented.7
Like any other security, companies regularly purchase and sell
mortgage-backed securities as a form of investment, profit, and
capitalization.8 However, because the value of these securities is ultimately
tied to the mortgage payments that underwrite them, the potential for fraud
arises if a company is not forthright about the underlying source of the
security‘s value.9 The recent high-profile indictment of the largest
investment bank in the United States, Goldman Sachs, illustrates this
point.10 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleges that
Goldman Sachs intentionally created a mortgage-backed financial
instrument comprised of high-risk mortgages with the purpose of inducing
private investors to purchase securities in this instrument while Goldman
Sachs shorted the instrument to make money on the collapse of the housing
market.11 Under such an arrangement, investors lost money as the crisis
unfolded and Goldman Sachs made money by betting that the instrument‘s
value would decline.12
Mortgage-backed securities are not the only origin of securities fraud,
and they are not the focus of discussion here. They do, however, represent
a considerable source of potential fraud given recent economic events, and
they are relevant to this Comment only to the extent that they illustrate the

6. Id.
7. See Fraud Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division
of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission) (noting that some of
the assets on the books of public companies were underwritten by mortgages).
8. Id.
9. See id. (reporting the possible failure of companies to disclose the proper value of
mortgage-backed assets and the possibility that companies made false or misleading
statements regarding the value of those assets).
10. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 16, 2010) (charging Goldman Sachs with securities fraud in connection with activity in
the mortgage-backed securities market).
11. See Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in
Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at A1 (explaining the SEC‘s indictment of
Goldman Sachs and detailing the nature of the alleged securities fraud scheme).
12. See id. (reporting that the focus of the SEC‘s case is an investment vehicle, Abacus
2007-AC1, created by Goldman Sachs so the bank and some of its clients could bet against
the housing market). As a note, since the writing of this Comment, Goldman Sachs has
settled its case with the SEC for 550 million dollars. See Sewell Chan & Louise Story,
Goldman Pays $550 Million to Settle Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 16, 2010, at A1.
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immediate saliency of private securities litigation.13 Indeed, in addition to
the indictment of Goldman Sachs, the SEC has started to bring a number of
actions specifically implicating mortgage-backed securities as a source of
securities fraud on the investing public.14
While the SEC intervenes to protect investors in a general sense by
correcting market violations, it does not facilitate individual monetary
recovery.15 Individual investors who sustain financial losses resulting from
securities fraud must bring claims in their individual, private capacities. 16
The road to financial recovery begins with properly pleading the elements
of the underlying securities fraud claim. This Comment will focus on the
pleading standard for one of those elements: the element of ―loss
causation.‖17 Loss causation is a statutorily-created element of a private
securities fraud claim, and it represents the causal connection between the
defendant‘s fraudulent act and the plaintiff‘s economic injury.18
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(the PSLRA), a statutory scheme that heightened the pleading standard for
certain elements of a private securities fraud claim to require ―particularity‖

13. See Fraud Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division
of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange Commission) (noting that ―a central
issue‖ of recent SEC enforcement cases is whether investors received accurate disclosures
concerning the deteriorating business conditions, increased risks, and downward pressure on
asset values).
14. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Morrice, No. SACV09-01426 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2009) (alleging that the officers of New Century Financial, Corp., one of the largest subprime mortgage lenders in the United States prior to the financial crisis, made material false
and misleading statements regarding the true financial health of the company); Complaint at
3–4, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2009) (charging that officers of
Countrywide Financial deliberately misled investors about the significant credit risks the
company was taking in its efforts to expand its market share); Complaint at 2–3, SEC v.
Strauss, No. 09-CIV-4150 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (accusing the officers of American
Mortgage Investment Corp. of converting loan losses in the tens of millions of dollars into
fictional profits).
15. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 2, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78d
(2006) (creating the Securities and Exchange Commission for the broad and collective
purposes of protecting the ―public interest‖ and ―insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and
honest markets . . . ― (emphasis added)).
16. See discussion infra Part I.A.1 (explaining that the most common form of a
securities fraud claim is a Rule 10b-5 claim under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act). This
Comment will assume that theory of action when discussing a ―securities fraud claim‖
generically.
17. See discussion infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the element of ―loss causation‖).
18. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4) (requiring a plaintiff to plead the
element of loss causation in a private securities claim); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (explaining that Congress intended to permit private securities actions
only where plaintiffs adequately show the element of causation); see also infra Part I.A.1
(discussing securities fraud claims generally and the element of loss causation specifically).
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at the pleadings stage.19 Additionally, the PSLRA formally created the
element of loss causation as a requirement of a private securities fraud
claim.20 The PSLRA did not, however, specify the pleading standard under
which loss causation would be pled.21 Absent statutory guidance, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proper pleading standard.22
Due to the fact that loss causation is an element of a fraud claim, the
federal circuits have split regarding whether it should be pled under the
fraud pleading provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (Rule
9(b)) or the general pleading provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) (Rule 8(a)(2)).23 This split creates two issues for resolution.
The first issue is the one just mentioned—it is still unclear which
pleading standard applies to the element of loss causation.24 Thus, since
the PSLRA does not provide the proper pleading standard for the element
of loss causation, the first issue requires resolution of which pleading
standard governs pleading loss causation—the general pleading
requirements under Rule 8(a)(2), or the particularized requirements under
Rule 9(b) governing fraud claims.
As a result of this Comment‘s conclusion on the first issue that Rule
8(a)(2) should govern private securities fraud claims, the second issue
arises due to the Supreme Court‘s reinterpretation of that rule, requiring a
claimant to state a ―plausible‖ claim to relief at the pleading stage. The
plausibility standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly25 and
refined in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,26 looks similar to the particularity requirement
under Rule 9(b) despite the Court‘s insistence that plausibility pleading is

19. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109
Stat. 737 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing
heightened pleading standards for certain elements of a private securities fraud claim).
20. Id. § 105.
21. Id.
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (outlining the requirements for properly pleading a complaint);
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 87 (3d
ed. 2004) (―Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading embodied in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.‖).
23. Compare Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255 (5th Cir. 2009)
(adopting and applying Dura and Twombly‘s reading of Rule 8(a)(2) to the element of loss
causation), with In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2009) (clarifying
that in the Fourth Circuit, Rule 9(b) controls all averments of fraud, and that Rule 9(b) is the
proper pleading standard for pleading loss causation).
24. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat.
737 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing heightened
pleading standards for certain elements of a private securities fraud claim but not for the
element of loss causation).
25. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (stating that a complaint must show certain factual matter
to give rise to the plausibility of entitlement to relief).
26. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–53 (2009) (outlining a formal two-prong approach to
plausibility pleading and extending it to all civil claims).
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not a heightened standard.27 As a matter of logic, there may be substantial
interplay between what is particular and what is plausible.28 Further,
pleading plausibility may actually be a more difficult standard to meet than
pleading factual particularity in certain complex pleading contexts such as
a securities fraud claim.29 This is due to the fact that defining the ―cause‖
of a given event often inherently requires a certain level of particularity,
and this requirement is augmented by the fact-sensitive nature of a private
securities fraud claim.30 Adding a requirement of plausibility to this
factually sensitive context, a plaintiff must not only identify which was the
cause of his injury through pleading its factual particularities, a plaintiff
must also identify a theory of causation that is plausible.31 In effect,
meeting a standard of plausibility will entail pleading factual particularity.32
Accordingly, the second issue that this Comment will address is the
operation of plausibility pleading in factually complex contexts such as
private securities litigation.
A brief explanation will help illuminate this second issue. The basic
scheme of loss causation requires a plaintiff to identify the causal chain
between the defendant‘s act of fraud (a material misstatement or omission)
and the plaintiff‘s economic injury, which is usually a financial loss in the
form of a decline in share price.33 The difficulty in identifying the correct
causal chain derives from the fact that there are a myriad of potential
causes for a decline in a share price.34 Even if the defendant perpetrated a
fraud, it does not necessarily follow that the fraudulent act, and not some
other act (e.g. poor company performance, natural disaster, unfavorable
economic conditions generally) caused the decline in share price and the
27. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 473–75
(2008) (suggesting that it is difficult to distinguish any meaningful difference between
―particularity‖ under Rule 9(b) and ―plausibility‖ under Rule 8(a)(2)).
28. Id.
29. Cf. id. at 475-76 (stating that plausibility under Twombly ―is the very definition of
particularized pleading‖). While it does not necessarily follow from this statement that
plausibility under Iqbal is more scrutinizing than particularity pleading under Rule 9(b), it
does at least support such a proposition in certain contexts and this proposition will be
further supported later in the text. See discussion infra Part II.B.
30. See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud,
94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 821 (2009) (explaining that a loss causation analysis is particularly
difficult in the securities fraud context because of the many factors that can affect the value
of a securities investment).
31. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (noting that when a
purchaser resells shares at a lower price after an alleged misrepresentation by an issuer, the
lower price is not necessarily the result of the alleged misrepresentation, but often of
changed economic conditions, and ―[o]ther things being equal, the longer the time between
purchase and sale, . . . the more likely that other factors caused the loss.‖).
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 51–54.
34. Fisch, supra note 30, at 821.

JASON HAYCOCK 60.1

180

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:173

plaintiff‘s subsequent economic injury.35 Therefore, the plaintiff must not
only sufficiently identify a particular causal chain of events, but that causal
chain must also be a plausible explanation for the plaintiff‘s loss.
In this situation, it may be that the ―general,‖ plausibility pleading
requirements under Rule 8(a)(2) would actually be stricter than a simple
particularity requirement under Rule 9(b).36 This appears likely in complex
claims such as securities fraud where there tends to be a significant amount
of factual information surrounding a claim.37 It is therefore important to
understand not only which rule governs the pleading standard for loss
causation, but also the practical effect of the governing rule on a plaintiff‘s
ability to advance a successful claim.
Part I will provide the background information regarding the pleading
standards under Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b), pleading within the context of
a securities fraud claim specifically, and the various circuit courts‘
application of the pleading standards to the specific element of loss
causation. Part II will analyze and address the proper pleading standard for
loss causation as well as the practical effect of that pleading standard on
properly pleading loss causation. This Comment will conclude by taking
notice of the broader policy implications of these arguments within the
general private securities litigation context.
35. See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343–46 (holding that a complaint in a securities
fraud action must prove more than an inflated purchase price on the date of purchase to
establish that defendant‘s misrepresentation proximately caused economic loss); Law v.
Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786–87 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing a securities fraud
claim for failure to show loss causation after finding that defendant‘s share price moved in
tandem with competitors‘ share price, so it was sufficient to conclude that market forces
created plaintiff‘s loss).
36. There are some interesting implications following this assertion that touch on
broader issues concerning the relationship between the plausibility pleading standard under
Rule 8(a)(2) and the particularity pleading standard under Rule 9(b). Plausibility can be a
more difficult standard to meet than particularity in certain contexts. As discussed in Part
II.B, something can be sufficiently particular without crossing the line into the realm of
plausibility. It is possible to imagine that a plaintiff could bring a claim that is highly
particular and detailed in its factual recitation. Regardless of how particular that plaintiff‘s
claim is (even if possible), however, pleading factual particularity does not ensure that the
claim will be deemed plausible. This concern has implications broader than the scope of
this Comment will allow, but it is important to examine the plausibility-particularity
interplay in all complex contexts where, as here, Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b) run up against
each other.
37. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12:11[3], at 167 (6th
ed. 2010) (explaining that pleading loss causation can be a highly factual matter and noting
that ―failure to specifically allege facts showing loss causation will result in dismissal‖)
(emphasis added); Fisch, supra note 30, at 821 (noting that stock prices can be impacted by
many nonfraudulent events, which the court must ascertain); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleadings: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 A.U. L. REV. 553,
605–09 (2010)(providing empirical data supporting the proposition that more complex
claims are more likely to be dismissed under an Iqbal analysis than under Twombly or
Conley).
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BACKGROUND

There are essentially three pleadings standards at issue in the private
securities fraud context: (1) the heightened pleading standards under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act; (2) the general pleading standards
under Rule 8(a)(2), and; (3) the particularity pleading standards under Rule
9(b). Part A will address each of these standards as well as begin by
introducing a more comprehensive definition of the element of loss
causation. Part B will survey the case law to examine how the Supreme
Court and the federal circuits have handled these various pleading
standards with respect to the element of loss causation.
A. An Introduction to the Element of Loss Causation and the General
Standards of Pleading
The three aforementioned pleading standards converge in the context of
pleading loss causation. Thus, to persuasively argue which standard
applies and to understand the practical effects flowing therefrom, each
pleading standard must be parsed and explored, beginning with the
standards under the PSLRA and moving to Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b),
respectively. However, to provide context, it is first necessary to
understand a private securities fraud claim broadly and the element of loss
causation specifically.
1.

A private securities fraud claim and the element of loss causation
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)38
prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.39
The statutory language itself, however, does not create a cause of action.40
Rather, it sets up the general prohibition on securities fraud and then
delegates the authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission to
promulgate rules of enforcement.41
The SEC subsequently promulgated Rule 10b-5 to give practical effect
to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Rule 10b-5 essentially prohibits
making any untrue statement of a material fact, or the omission thereof, and
the engagement in any fraudulent act in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.42 Rule 10b-5‘s language is broad and extends to
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. (proscribing activity ―in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors‖).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (interpreting § 10(b) of the Exchange Act to set up an
enforceable rule of liability for a violation thereof).

JASON HAYCOCK 60.1

182

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:173

nearly every statement that a company makes concerning its operations43
subject to certain designated exceptions, or ―safe-harbors.‖44
Rule 10b-5 originally created a cause of action only for the SEC.45
However, the courts have since interpreted the rule as implying a private
right of action as well.46 In bringing a private claim, however, the courts
also require that a complaint include the common law elements of fraud in
addition to the two statutory elements created under the PSLRA: economic
loss and loss causation.47
Loss causation is defined in section 21D(b)(4) of the Exchange Act and
provides that for any private action, a plaintiff must prove that the act
complained of caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages.48 Analytically, loss causation is often best understood as
analogous to the tort element of ―proximate cause.‖49 At its simplest, it is
the causal link between the defendant‘s fraudulent act and the plaintiff‘s
economic injury.50 Like proximate cause, loss causation adopts the ―legal
cause‖ (as opposed to the ―but for‖ cause) approach to attaching liability.51
That is, a plaintiff must show that his injury is directly attributable to the
defendant‘s fraudulent act, but not that the defendant‘s act was the ―but
for‖ cause of plaintiff‘s injury.52 It should be noted, however, that loss
causation generally receives greater scrutiny in assessing the viability of
43. Id. (―[I]n connection with the purchase or sale of any security‖).
44. ―Safe harbor‖ refers to exceptions created by statute or rule that allow certain
statements to be protected against liability under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 21E (providing a safe harbor for ―forward-looking‖ statements that attempt
to forecast future business conditions).
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (making it unlawful to defraud).
46. The Supreme Court has never squarely held that a private right of action lies for a
Rule 10b-5 claim. There is, however, well-recognized support for that proposition. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (observing that for forty
years, the lower courts have recognized implied private rights of action under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its counterpart, Rule 10b-5, and stating that
―[t]he existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure‖).
47. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (outlining the
requirements for a securities fraud claim as: (1) a material misrepresentation, or omission,
of fact; (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; (3) in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance (sometimes referred to as ―transaction causation‖); (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation, i.e. a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss).
48. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4) (defining the element of ―loss
causation‖ and requiring a private plaintiff to plead it in his claim of securities fraud).
49. See, e.g., McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that, similar to tort law, a securities fraud plaintiff ―must show that the loss was foreseeable
and that the loss was caused by the materialization of the concealed risk‖).
50. Id.
51. See HAZEN, supra note 37, § 12:11[1], at 152 (explaining that causation in securities
law involves a similar analysis as causation under the common law for tort and contracts
cases).
52. See id. § 12:11[3], at 159.
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securities fraud claims than does the element of proximate cause in general
fraud claims.53 Additionally, although the focus of this Comment is on the
procedural aspects of loss causation, it is helpful to understand that as a
substantive matter, loss causation is most commonly shown where there is
a price movement in shares that sufficiently corresponds to the fraudulent
misstatement or omission.54
2. Pleading requirements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act
In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA to raise the pleading standards in
private securities fraud litigation in an effort to curb abusive litigation.55
The heightened pleading standards resemble the particularity standards of
Rule 9(b).56 Section 21D(b)(1) of the Exchange Act essentially requires
that for any private action57 alleging a misstatement or omission of material
fact, the plaintiff must plead with particularity.58
The revised pleading standards under the PSLRA do not, however,
discuss their applicability to the other elements of a 10b-5 claim beyond
their applicability to the element of a misstatement or omission of material
fact.59 With respect to the element of loss causation, section 21D(b)(4) of
the Exchange Act states only that a plaintiff must prove that the act or
omission was the cause of the loss; it does not state the pleading standard
that the plaintiff must meet in attempting to show that causal connection at
the pleading stage.60 Consistent with the Exchange Act‘s lack of specific
application, the Supreme Court has given strong indication (and the federal

53. See id. (contrasting the level of scrutiny in the analysis of loss causation and
proximate causation and noting that loss causation in securities law imposes stricter
requirements than proximate causation would in general fraud claims).
54. Id. § 12:11[1], at 150–52.
55. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 730 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730 (citing evidence of abusive practices in securities litigation,
including the routine filing of lawsuits whenever there is a significant change in stock price,
―with only faint hope that discovery might lead to some plausible cause of action‖).
56. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (―[A] party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.‖), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 (2006) (―[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading . . . and, if [the] allegation . . . is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.‖) (emphasis
added).
57. Thus, the requirements do not apply to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
58. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1) (outlining heightened pleading
standards).
59. See id. (applying the particularity standard only to statements alleged to be
misleading).
60. See id. § 21D(b)(4) (stating only that the plaintiff has ―the burden of proving‖ the
requisite causal connection, but omitting any definition of what that burden of proof shall
require at the pleading stage).
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circuit courts have agreed) that the heightened pleading standards of the
PSLRA do not apply to the element of loss causation.61 Thus, if the
heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA do not apply to loss causation
(due to the statute‘s silence and the courts‘ recognition of that silence), 62
then a reasonable question arises regarding which pleading standard does
apply—the traditional pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2), or the
heightened particularity standard under Rule 9(b), which was specifically
designed to apply to claims alleging fraud.63
3.

Rule 8(a)(2)
Rule 8(a)(2) sets out the fundamental pleading standard for civil
litigation and governs all claims in a civil suit.64 It requires that a claim
contain ―a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.‖65 For the past sixty years, the ―short and plain statement‖ recital
has been commonly referred to as ―notice pleading.‖66
The development of notice pleading was a cognizant attempt to relax
pleading standards and to move away from the confusing Code pleadings
scheme of the nineteenth century.67 Notice pleading was intended to be
liberal in allowing claims to advance procedurally so that they would
receive an evaluation on their merits.68 The adequacy of the pleading was

61. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (deciding the case on
the assumption that Rule 8(a)(2) applied, and not resorting to the PSLRA for guidance on
the pleading standard).
62. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119–20 (4th Cir. 2009)
(―Because Congress only addressed misrepresentations[,] [fraud] and scienter in
§ 78u-4b [of the PSLRA], the other elements of a securities fraud claim are analyzed under
the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . [T]he PSLRA‘s
heightened pleading requirements do not govern our analysis of . . . loss causation.‖).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
64. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1202, at 87 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that Rule
8 is the ―keystone‖ of the Rules-based pleading system).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
66. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (―[A]ll the Rules require is a short
and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff‘s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‖).
67. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 862–66 (2010) (discussing the Code
pleading system as an evolution from the belief in the ability to concretely distinguish a
statement of fact from a conclusion of law and as a reaction to the perceived
―hypertechnicality and . . . irrationality of the common law forms of action and common law
pleading[;]‖ explaining how the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
reacting, in turn, to the legal realist movement that critiqued the ability to meaningfully
distinguish between a statement of fact and a legal conclusion—in essence, the distinction
―depends on the degree of factual specificity‖). The author also argues that the ―pure notice
pleading system has little need for a distinction between legal conclusions and factual
allegations [because] . . . [t]he question for notice pleading is whether the complaint, taken
as a whole, gives fair notice of what the dispute is about.‖ Id.
68. Id. at 864–65.
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analyzed under the ―no set of facts‖ standard, where courts would appraise
the sufficiency of a complaint on whether ―it appear[ed] beyond a
reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.‖69 To determine whether no set of
facts existed, the courts took a holistic approach, evaluating the claim in its
factual entirety.70
The traditional notice pleading under the no set of facts71 standard,
however, is no longer good law.72 In 2007, the Supreme Court clarified
that a complaint‘s sufficiency had always entailed the notion that the claim
to relief must be plausible.73 In Twombly the Supreme Court abrogated its
no set of facts standard74 derived from Conley v. Gibson75 and instead
required that a plaintiff present enough factual matter to lead to a plausible
conclusion of wrongdoing.76 The Court was careful to clarify that requiring
―plausible grounds to infer [illegal conduct]‖ was not the same as
―impos[ing] a probability requirement at the pleading stage.‖77
Though the Court stressed that it did not impose a probability standard at
the pleadings stage it nonetheless emphasized that Conley was never
intended to be read so strictly as to positively require a complaint to move
forward unless it was impossible to show some set of facts on which the
plaintiff could prevail.78 Rather, ―a complaint . . . must contain either direct
or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to

69. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added) (outlining the ―no set of facts‖
standard).
70. See Bone, supra note 67, at 865–66 (explaining that the purpose of notice pleading
is very simply to provide notice, and in determining whether the notice is sufficient, the
entire complaint must be taken under consideration).
71. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (outlining the traditionally liberal pleading standard
that a complaint should not be dismissed ―unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief‖).
72. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009) (―[a]cknowledging that
Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test . . . .‖).
73. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–62 (2007) (reading the factual
requirement in Conley‟s ―no set of facts‖ standard to have implicitly required plausibility
when considered within the context of the complaint as a whole); see also WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 22, § 1202, at 94 (acknowledging that the Rules Advisory Committee
intended the rule to ―contemplate the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in
support of the claim presented‖).
74. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (stating that because the phrase ―no set of facts‖ has
been so misunderstood—to the point that the plausibility concept that the Court now claims
is inherent in its reading is most often left unapplied—the term has ―earned its retirement‖
and is ―best forgotten as . . . incomplete‖).
75. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
76. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
77. Id. at 556.
78. Id. at 561–62 (referencing courts and commentators who have resisted a literal
reading of Conley‘s no-set-of-facts language).
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sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.‖79 That is, the complaint
taken as a whole requires some element of plausibility, and plausibility is
sufficient where the complaint alleges factual matter that allows for ―direct
or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements [of the
claim]. . . .‖80
In Iqbal, the Court explicitly extended the Twombly plausibility pleading
standard to all civil litigation and modified the formal analysis in
determining sufficient plausibility.81 The Court formalized a two-prong
approach that it claimed applied the underlying jurisprudential principles of
the Twombly decision.82 The first prong required the Court to separate
factual allegations from legal conclusions.83 The Court then dismissed
those allegations deemed to be ―conclusory‖ on the basis that bare legal
conclusions are not entitled to the privilege that all well-pled facts be taken
as true at the motion to dismiss stage.84 The second prong then applied the
plausibility test to the remaining allegations.85 The formal two-prong
approach is the current standard for evaluating the plausibility of a
complaint under Rule 8(a)(2).
4.

Rule 9(b)
Whereas Rule 8(a)(2) applies to civil claims generally, Rule 9(b) is the
traditional standard for pleading claims that assert a commission of fraud.86
It requires a claimant to state with particularity the circumstances that
constitute that act of fraud.87 Because claims of fraud entail a certain
stigmatizing effect upon the defendant,88 the purpose of requiring
79. Id. at 562 (quoting Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
80. Id.; see Bone, supra note 67, at 859 (explaining that Twombly interprets the
complaint as a whole when determining which statements are simply conclusory and do not
contribute anything factually new to the complaint). But see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1960–61 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court erred in analyzing the
complaint in isolated parts because Iqbal‘s allegations are sufficiently specific when
considering the complaint as a whole).
81. 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (stating that Twombly is applicable to ―all civil actions‖).
82. Id. at 1949–50.
83. Id.
84. Id. (explaining that while the court must ―take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true‖, it is ―not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Id. at 1950.
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (stating that for ―fraud or mistake‖ a plaintiff must plead
with ―particularity‖).
87. However, the particularity requirement does not apply to elements consisting of a
person‘s state of mind in a fraud claim; the second sentence of Rule 9(b) allows such
elements to be alleged generally. Id.
88. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the
purpose of Rule 9(b) as protecting a defendant against reputational harm consequent of
claims of fraudulent conduct); see also Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.,
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particularity in a fraud claim is to ensure responsibility89 and accuracy in
the claimant‘s complaint.90 The text of Rule 9(b) does not explicitly state
what particularity requires, but it has generally been interpreted to include
the ―who, what, when, where, and how‖ of the alleged fraud.91 The exact
kind of facts required for a claim to be sufficiently particular will tend to
vary with the context of the underlying claim.92
While it is clear that Rule 9(b) applies to all claims that ―alleg[e] fraud or
mistake[,]‖93 what is not as clear is the scope of the ―circumstances [that]
constitut[e] [the] fraud or mistake.‖94 ―Circumstances‖ becomes a difficult
term to define. While the term generally includes the ―who, what, when,
where, and how‖ discussed above,95 the term is ambiguous enough to
potentially sweep up any and all elements of a claim of fraud96—including,
theoretically, the element of loss causation in a securities fraud claim.97

567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing the three purposes of Rule 9(b) as:
(1) providing defendants with adequate notice while at the same time preventing plaintiffs
from filing complaints as a pretext for discovery of unknown wrongs; (2) protecting
defendants from reputational harm; (3) avoiding the social and economic costs of litigation
absent factual basis for a claim).
89. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1296, at 38–39 (noting that courts are
frequently concerned with irresponsible ―fishing expeditions‖ that seek to use litigation and
the prospect of discovery solely as an attempt to learn ―whether unknown wrongs actually
have occurred,‖ and that forcing a plaintiff to be more particular helps to ensure that
plaintiffs are more responsible in bringing their claims and allows defendants to have
accurate information upon which to build an adequate defense).
90. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (commenting on the
utility of Rule 9(b)‘s particularity requirement in the context of certain subjects [such as
fraud] because they otherwise risk ―abusive litigation‖ under the general pleading standard
of Rule 8(a)(2)); Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke‘s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir.
1999)) (clarifying that the reason for the heightened pleading of ―particularity‖ is to ensure
that the claim of alleged fraud is ―responsible and supported, rather than defamatory and
extortionate‖ (internal citation omitted)); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1296,
at 31 (identifying the primary purpose of the heightened pleading requirements under Rule
9(b) as a desire to protect a defendant‘s ―reputation and goodwill,‖ and extensively detailing
the case law across the circuits in support of this proposition.).
91. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 853 (7th
Cir. 2009) (stating that ―particularity‖ means providing the essential elements found ―in the
first paragraph of any newspaper story‖).
92. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1296, at 53 (recognizing that the
particularity requirement will have varying effect in different contexts and that in some
situations ―a motion to dismiss alleging noncompliance . . . is virtually assured in certain
categories . . . . ―) (emphasis added); cf. Spencer, supra note 27, at 441–47 (discussing that
in the context of plausibility pleading under Rule 8(a)(2), facts sufficient to lead to a
plausible claim will generally vary considerably with the context of the underlying claim
itself).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Lusby, 570 F.3d at 853 (defining ―particularity‖ as ―the who, what, when,
where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story.‖).
96. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1297, at 74 (suggesting that a ―prudent‖
lawyer may wish to plead ―all of the elements of fraud [with
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Given the fact that a securities fraud claim is predicated on the
commission of a fraud—an intentional misstatement or omission of
material fact—there is a legitimate question as to whether Rule 9(b) should
govern the pleading standard for all elements of a securities fraud claim not
already covered by the PSLRA, such as the element
of loss causation.98 Moreover, Congress made explicit its desire to
heighten pleading standards in the private securities fraud context in order
to curb frivolous and abusive litigation.99 Thus, if Congress desired to
heighten the pleading standards in private securities fraud litigation
generally, requiring loss causation to be pled under Rule 9(b) would be
consistent with that congressional intent and therefore may be the proper
standard.100

particularity] . . . whenever that is possible . . . [because] sometimes federal judges have
gone beyond the limited text of Rule 9(b) and have required more particularity on a greater
range of subjects‖) (emphasis added).
97. Cf. SEC v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 237, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(addressing a market manipulation claim and asserting that ―[t]o satisfy Rule 9(b)
. . . [the] claim must specify what manipulative acts were performed, which defendants
performed them, when the manipulative acts were performed, and what effect the scheme
had on the market for the securities at issue‖) (emphasis added). The added requirement
that the plaintiff must show in his claim the effect of the scheme is suggestive of a sort of
causal relationship—how some action affected or caused some detriment; this lends some
support for the proposition that the element of loss causation could be swept up in Rule
9(b)‘s
particularity
requirement.
But see, e.g., United States ex rel. Marlar v. BWXT Y-12, L.L.C, 525 F.3d 439, 444
(6th Cir. 2008) (restating the oft-used recitals of the minimum requirements for Rule 9(b) as
essentially: time, place, and content; reliance; the fraudulent scheme itself; fraudulent
intent; and injury resulting from the fraud). These familiar Rule 9(b) recitals mention the
requirements of ―fraudulent scheme‖ and ―injury,‖ but they consistently fail to include the
requirement of the causal connection between the two. See, e.g., id.
98. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119–20 (4th Cir. 2009) (―Congress
only addressed misrepresentations[,] [fraud] and scienter in [the PSLRA], the other elements
of a securities fraud claim are analyzed under the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure . . . the PSLRA‘s heightened pleading requirements do not govern our
analysis of . . . loss causation.‖).
99. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat.
737, 743–49 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (listing the
heightened pleading standard requirements in a section titled ―Reduction of Abusive
Litigation‖); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1301.1, at 279 (detailing congressional
concern that Rule 9(b) was not being properly applied to ―frivolous‖ securities litigation and
that more action was needed to curb abusive litigation).
100. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (stating
in dicta that as a general matter, ―[p]rior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a
complaint for securities fraud was governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading
standards
set
forth
in
Rule
9(b).‖)
(emphasis
added).
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731, 736 (discussing throughout a desire to curb vexatious securities
litigation chiefly aimed at inducing settlement).
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B. Judicial Application of Pleading Standards to the
Element of Loss Causation
While the courts have been consistent in acknowledging that the
pleading standards under the PSLRA do not apply to the element of loss
causation,101 they have diverged on whether the proper standard should be
Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 9(b). To determine what the proper pleading standard
should be, it is important to survey the courts‘ reasoning in support of each
approach. The survey will begin with the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo102 where the Court assumed Rule
8(a)(2) as the pleading standard for the purpose of addressing the
substantive requirements of loss causation. The survey will continue with
an examination of the federal circuit courts that follow the Rule 8(a)(2)
approach, and those courts that follow the Rule 9(b) approach.
The Supreme Court‟s implicit adoption of Rule 8(a)(2)
In Dura,103 the Supreme Court addressed a Ninth Circuit decision
holding that the purchase of an artificially inflated stock price, without
more, was sufficient to establish the element of loss causation.104 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that when a material misstatement or omission
causes the price of a stock to be artificially inflated, the purchaser of that
stock would necessarily suffer the economic loss at the time of purchase. 105
Therefore, because the material misstatement or omission caused the
artificial price, that same material misstatement or omission legally caused
the economic loss to the purchaser (the form of economic loss being the
initial overpayment for the stock).106
The Supreme Court rejected this approach107 and ultimately found that
an ―‗artificially inflated purchase price‘ is not itself a relevant economic
loss.‖108 The Court reasoned that the transaction involving the artificially
inflated price did not guarantee that an injury or loss would occur; the
1.

101. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 120 (recognizing that Congress
only addressed the pleading standards of the elements of misrepresentation, fraud, and
scienter with the PSLRA; it did not address the element of loss causation, so it is governed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
102. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
103. Id.
104. See Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
showing the purchase of an inflated stock price, absent showing the subsequent decline in
stock price, is sufficient as a substantive showing of loss causation)
rev‘d 544 U.S. 336, remanded to 452 F.Supp. 2d 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
105. Id.
106. See Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342–44 (restating the reasoning of the 9th
Circuit‘s decision).
107. Id. at 338.
108. Id. at 347.
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causal requirement (loss causation) was not necessarily satisfied because
the purchase of the stock at the inflated price alone did not result in an
injury in fact where it was not accompanied by some actual economic loss
(through the sale of the stock).109 The Court noted that when the purchaser
finally sells the share, even at a lower price, the lower price might be the
product of other factors and not necessarily the result of the material
misstatements or omissions.110 Thus, the ―purchase price will not itself
constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.‖111
While the Court‘s determination of the substantive requirements of loss
causation has implications for the procedural pleading requirements of loss
causation, the Court‘s loss causation analysis within the pleading context of
Rule 8(a)(2) is the immediate concern. The Court explained that the
―ordinary pleading rules [in Rule 8] are not meant to impose a great burden
upon a plaintiff.‖112 The Court then cited Conley for the proposition that
even though the claim may be a ―‗short and plain statement‘ . . . [it] must
provide the defendant with ‗fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.‘‖113 That is, the plaintiff in Dura failed to
meet Rule 8(a)(2)‘s pleading standard because he failed to provide
―adequate grounds‖ for a right to relief.114 The Court went on to discuss
that while there should not be too heavy of a burden on the plaintiff in
showing loss causation,115 it must be balanced against the purpose of the
securities statutes in curbing abusive litigation practices.116 While the
Court did not directly hold that the element of loss causation would be
evaluated under Rule 8(a)(2), by assuming the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading
standard in its substantive analysis, the Court gave clear indication of a
preference for that rule over Rule 9(b) in assessing the adequacy of
pleading loss causation.117
109. Id. at 342–43.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 342.
112. See id. at 347 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–15
(2002))(representing the most recent affirmation of ―notice pleading‖).
113. Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 346. Interestingly, this language arguably serves as
the foundation for the Court‘s rhetorical shift to the ―enough factual matter (taken as true)‖
language in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 550, 556 (2007), to requiring a
plaintiff to allege sufficient factual content to ―[nudge his claim] . . . across the line from
conceivable to plausible‖ in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
114. Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 346.
115. Id. at 347.
116. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 (noting a desire to curb ―abusive practices including the routine filing of lawsuits .
. . with only a faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action‖(emphasis added)).
117. Dura Pharm, Inc., 544 U.S. at 346–47. But see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (stating in dicta that as a general matter, ―[p]rior to
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2.

The Rule 8(a)(2) approach
Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have clearly adopted Rule 8(a)(2) as
the pleading standard for loss causation. The Fifth Circuit has adopted
Rule 8(a)(2) as the governing standard while specifically including
Twombly‘s plausibility gloss.118 The Eighth Circuit is the first circuit court
to address loss causation since the Supreme Court handed down Iqbal, and
it expressly applied Iqbal‘s two-prong analysis.119
a.

Explicit adoption of Rule 8(a)(2) in light of Twombly and Dura:
The Fifth Circuit approach

In Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,120 the Fifth Circuit specifically
discussed the effect of the Twombly plausibility standard on the element of
loss causation in a Rule 10b-5 claim. The court began by suggesting that
the Twombly Court relied, in part, on the Dura Court‘s discussion of the
purpose of securities legislation and the desire to avoid abusive litigation in
developing the plausibility pleading standard.121 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that a contiguous reading of Dura and Twombly required that
loss causation be pled under the plausibility standard of Rule 8(a)(2).122
Consistent with the Dura and Twombly Courts, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the plausibility standard was not meant to be overly burdensome on the
plaintiff. The standard only required that the plaintiff allege enough factual
matter to allow the court to reasonably expect that discovery will reveal a
legitimate claim.123 The plausibility test for loss causation, according to the
Fifth Circuit, is one in the alternative that requires the ―plaintiff [either] to
allege . . . a facially ‗plausible‘ causal relationship between the fraudulent
statements or omissions and the plaintiff‘s economic loss [as Dura
indicates] . . .
or, as Twombly indicates, . . . allege enough facts to give rise to a

the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for securities fraud was
governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading standards set forth in Rule 9(b)‖)
(emphasis added).
118. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255 (5th Cir. 2009) (adopting the
Rule 8(a)(2) standard while giving deference to Twombly‘s interpretation thereof).
119. See McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 2009) (relying on Iqbal in
noting that the court is not required to accept as true a legal conclusion ―couched as factual
allegation,‖ and that the complaint must instead contain ―sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‗state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘‖).
120. 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 255.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 258 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007)) (―Asking
for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the illegal agreement.‖).
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reasonable hope or expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
foregoing elements of loss causation.‖124
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit approached the issue flexibly. Because it
formulated a test in the alternative, a plaintiff is provided with two options
to advance a claim.125 Additionally, the court read Dura to require only
that a plaintiff ―provide[] the defendants with notice of what the relevant
economic loss might be . . . and of what the causal connection might be
between that loss and the defendants‘ alleged misrepresentations.‖126 It
also read the Twombly plausibility standard somewhat permissibly,
requiring only that the allegation of facts give rise to a ―reasonable hope or
expectation‖ that discovery will provide the necessary evidence.127
In Lormand, the court found that both of these standards were met
(though meeting only one is sufficient).128 The Dura pleading standard was
satisfied because the plaintiff was suitably specific in detailing his loss—a
drop in share price of eighty-two percent129—and he gave the defendant fair
notice about his theory of loss causation where the omission of the effects
of the sub-prime credit program proximately caused the eighty-two percent
decrease.130 The Twombly pleading standard was satisfied because the
plaintiff presented enough by way of factual allegations (an eighty-two
percent decline in share price, and the omission of the effects of the subprime credit program) to give rise to a reasonable ―hope or expectation‖
that discovery would reveal evidence that loss causation existed in fact.131
b.

Explicit adoption of Rule 8(a)(2) in light of Iqbal: The Eighth
Circuit approach

In McAdams v. McCord,132 the Eighth Circuit went out of its way to
apply the newly explicated Iqbal plausibility standard. The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claim based on a failure to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA for the elements of fraud and
scienter.133 The Eighth Circuit, however, asserted its authority to review
dismissals
under
Rule
12(b)(6)
de
novo.134
It noted that the district court did not reach the issue of loss causation, but
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
584 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1113.
Id.

JASON HAYCOCK 60.1

2010]

PLEADING A LOSS CAUSE

193

because it wanted to decide the matter, the court reiterated that it ―may
affirm the district court‘s judgment ‗on any basis supported by the
record.‘‖135 The court began with the now familiar Iqbal recital that it is
―not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as a factual
allegation,‖136 and that a ―complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‖137
In its analysis, the court quickly moved to the ―threadbare,‖
―conclusory‖ language of Iqbal to conclude that the plaintiffs‘ claims of
losses exceeding ten million dollars (the figure that represented the total
amount of their investment) due to material misstatements and omissions of
fact were simply conclusory.138 The court required the complaint to plead
both
the
purchase
price
of
the
share
and
the share price immediately following the revelation of the misstatement.139
The lack of this specific (or ―particular‖) information rendered the
allegations conclusory and ―defeat[ed] the plausibility of the investors‘
claim that [the defendant‘s] audit opinions . . . caused their losses.‖140
3.

The Rule 9(b) approach
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have indicated a
willingness to analyze pleading loss causation under Rule 9(b). The Fourth
Circuit has explicitly stated that it will evaluate the element of loss
causation under Rule 9(b).141 The Ninth Circuit, after having its analysis
concerning the substantive sufficiency of loss causation as pled under Rule
8(a)(2) overturned by the Supreme Court in Dura, has since assumed that
Rule 9(b) governed pleading loss causation in a 2008 case. 142 The Ninth
Circuit did not, however, directly hold that Rule 9(b) is the applicable
pleading standard.143
a.

Explicit adoption of Rule 9(b): The Fourth Circuit approach

In In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation,144 the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA do not

135. Id. at 1113–14.
136. Id. at 1113.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1114–15.
139. Id. at 1115.
140. Id.
141. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2009).
142. See Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008)
(assuming, without deciding, that Rule 9(b) governs).
143. Id.
144. 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009).
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govern the issue of loss causation.145 It then stated that ―[p]rior to the
enactment of the [PSLRA], § 10(b) fraud claims in this circuit were
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), not Rule 8.‖146 The
Fourth Circuit therefore explained that under Rule 9(b) a plaintiff must
show loss causation with ―sufficient specificity to enable the court to
evaluate whether the necessary causal link exists.‖147 The court made
reference to Rule 8(a)(2) only to note that it was never used to plead claims
of fraud in the Fourth Circuit, and the court made no mention at all of the
Twombly plausibility pleading standard in the loss causation context.148
In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
pled the element of loss causation with sufficient specificity.149 The
plaintiffs provided particular facts regarding the misstatements in the
prospectuses, the revelation that the statements were false, the payment of
fines for the false statements, and the subsequent decline in share price.150
By alleging that the false or misleading statements printed in the
prospectuses that were drafted and disseminated by the defendants were at
least a ―substantial cause‖ in the decrease in share price, the plaintiff was
able to satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading standard.151
b.

Implicit adoption of Rule 9(b): The Ninth Circuit approach

In Berson v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc.,152 the Ninth Circuit did not
directly rule on which pleading standard applied to loss causation, but it did
assume a permissive formulation of Rule 9(b) for the purpose of analysis.
The plaintiffs argued for what was then the somewhat less stringent
standard under Rule 8(a)(2), while the defendants argued for the heightened
standard under Rule 9(b).153 The court acknowledged that neither it nor the
Supreme Court had decided the matter, and proceeded to ―assume—
without deciding—that Rule 9(b) governs,‖ and required that a plaintiff
plead loss causation with particularity.154 More specifically, the plaintiff
was required to give ―sufficient detail to give defendants ample notice of
plaintiff‘s loss causation theory, and to give the court some assurance that
the theory has a basis in fact.‖155 Like the Fourth Circuit in In re Mutual
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
Iqbal was handed down eleven days after this decision.
In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 129 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 128.
527 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id. at 989–90.
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Funds Investment Litigation, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of
plausibility.156 Moreover, after it explained that the plaintiff need only give
the court ―some assurance‖ that the claim had a basis in fact,157 the court
went on to declare that ―Rule 9(b) require[d] no more.‖158 The court‘s
rhetoric suggests that the Ninth Circuit might be flexible in its pleading
analysis even under the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).159
In Berson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently
pled loss causation under Rule 9(b).160 The court found that the plaintiffs
alleged facts particular enough to show that ―but for the circumstances that
the fraud concealed—namely, the fact that much of Applied Signal‘s
backlog had been halted by stop-work orders—plaintiffs‘ investment . . .
would not have lost its value.‖161 Pivotal to this conclusion may have been
the fact that the plaintiffs were able to describe the effect of these stopwork orders on the company‘s revenue.162 The plaintiffs showed that the
stop-work orders caused revenue to drop by twenty-five percent, which
subsequently led to a sixteen percent drop in the company‘s stock price.163
There is no discussion of the credibility of these calculations, but the court
found them sufficiently particular at the pleading stage.164
II. ANALYSIS
There are credible arguments on both sides of this federal circuit split.
Part A will set out to resolve which is the proper approach to pleading loss
causation. Resolving the proper pleading standard, however, is not enough.
Part B will explore the practical effects of that pleading standard on
pleading loss causation.

156. See id. (omitting from the analysis any mention of other circuits‘ analysis of the
element under Rule 8(a)(2) or the plausibility standard therein).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Contra Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009) (rejecting the Second
Circuit‘s ―flexible ‗plausibility standard‘‖).
160. Berson, 527 F.3d at 989.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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A. The Proper Pleading Standard for Loss Causation is Rule 8(a)(2)
as Demonstrated by an Analysis of “Causation” Generally and
Within the Tort Law Context, a Textual Reading of the Rules,
Supreme Court Precedent, and an Understanding of
the Traditional Common Law Elements of Fraud
As illustrated above, the federal circuit courts are split regarding the
proper pleading standard for loss causation.165 The Fourth Circuit makes
the reasonable argument for Rule 9(b) essentially through simple
syllogism: Rule 9(b) governs general fraud claims; a private securities
fraud claim is a subset of a general fraud claim; loss causation is an
element of a private securities fraud claim; therefore, Rule 9(b) should
govern the pleading standard for loss causation.166 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has used broad language in dicta to suggest that Rule 9(b) governs all
securities fraud claims.167 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit‘s survey of
the evolution of Supreme Court precedent, combined with Iqbal‘s broad
extension of plausibility pleading and the Eight Circuit‘s application
thereof, is an equally persuasive indication that the proper standard for
pleading loss causation is under Rule 8(a)(2).168
1.
a

Applying an analysis of causation generally and of proximate cause to
textual reading of Rule 9(b)
To determine which pleading standard applies to the element of loss
causation, it is first important to appreciate the concept of causation
generally. Causation as an element of a cause of action is difficult to define
legally.169 It does not readily lend itself to the same conceptually concrete

165. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 335, 346–47 (2005) (deciding the case
under the pre-Twombly Rule 8(a)(2) standard, but not directly holding that Rule 8(a)(2) is
the proper pleading standard for loss causation). Compare Berson, 527 F.3d at 989
(claiming that the Supreme Court assumed, but did not decide that Rule 8(a)(2) governs the
pleading of loss causation so this court was free to assume—without deciding—that Rule
9(b) applied), with Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255 (5th Cir. 2009)
(synthesizing Dura and Twombly to conclude that in deciding the Dura case under Rule
8(a)(2), the Supreme Court had essentially ―identified the basic principles of pleading loss
causation under Federal Rule of Procedure 8(a)(2)‖).
166. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119–20 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing
why Rule 9(b), not Rule 8(a)(2), governs fraud claims in the Fourth Circuit).
167. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (stating
in dicta that as a general matter, ―[p]rior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a
complaint for securities fraud was governed not by Rule 8, but by the heightened pleading
standards set forth in Rule 9(b)‖(emphasis added)) .
168. See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–56 (detailing the progression and refinement of
pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) from Dura to Twombly).
169. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 180, at 443 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing that despite
its name, ―proximate cause‖ is not truly about causation, but rather, it is about the
appropriate scope of liability).
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explanation that an element such as ―material misstatement‖ (i.e. some
important statement that is untrue) does. Logically, it is often difficult to
distinguish a causal event from an event simply resulting from some other
cause or event.
For example: if A caused B and B caused C, then A caused C in at least
some respect because B necessarily could not have caused C until A caused
B. Therefore, although we see B as the most immediate cause of C, it is
possible to argue that B was not the true cause of C because without A
there would have been no B to cause C. Viewed this way, A is the true
cause of C. Of course, A is nothing more than an event brought about by
some
other
cause
or
event such as A , thereby further confusing the ―true‖ cause, or cause in
fact, of C. Consequently, the law endeavors to circumvent and simplify
this enigma by narrowing what is otherwise an infinite chain of cause and
effect for the purposes of determining and attaching liability.170 That is, the
law actually defines the element of causation within a context of seeking to
determine responsibility and liability rather than seeking to glean the ―true‖
or ultimate cause of a given event or injury.171
Perhaps the best approach to understanding loss causation and which
pleading standard should apply to it is by analogy. The element of
proximate cause in the tort context is the most apt analogy for this
purpose.172 While proximate cause is an element of a tort claim, it is
analytically distinct from the negligent act that represents the underlying
source of the claim.173 This distinction is critical to understanding why
Rule 8(a)(2) is the applicable standard of pleading loss causation because
loss causation is not a ―circumstance constituting the fraud‖ within the
meaning of Rule 9(b).174
In the tort law context, proximate cause represents the merger between
cause in fact (i.e. the sort of physics-oriented causal chain of events
described in the example above) and a policy decision that the law makes

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 2009) (analogizing loss
causation in the securities fraud context to the common law requirement of ―proximate
causation‖ in the tort context); see also HAZEN, supra note 37, § 12:11[1], at 479–81
(describing the analysis of loss causation as similar to the analysis of proximate cause).
173. See DOBBS, supra note 169, § 182, at 447–48 (clarifying that the issue of proximate
cause is distinct from a defendant‘s negligent action and does not arise until after some
negligence has been identified).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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in defining the scope of liability for some actor‘s conduct.175 More simply,
proximate cause creates the legal connection between a defendant‘s
negligent conduct and a plaintiff‘s harm sufficient for the law to say that
the defendant ―caused,‖ and is therefore liable for, the plaintiff‘s injury.176
That causal connection, however, is itself something distinct from the
defendant‘s action177—it simply represents a string that fastens the act to
the injury and thus creates the basis for the actor‘s legal liability.178 The
question of causation itself does not arise until after a defendant has
committed some act that creates the basis for his liability.179 The causal
chain of events, beginning with a defendant‘s action and resulting in a
plaintiff‘s injury, is therefore not itself an event that constitutes the
defendant‘s action.180
By analogy then, the element of loss causation is not a circumstance that
constitutes an act of securities fraud, so it should not be pled under Rule
9(b). Because the issue of causation arises only after the commission of an
act that gives rise to legal liability, the element of causation cannot properly
be said to be a ―circumstance[] constituting‖ that act within the language of
Rule 9(b).181 Rather, it is simply the legal device that strings together the
defendant‘s already constituted fraudulent act and the plaintiff‘s economic
loss for the purpose of attaching legal accountability. Thus, given that the
PSLRA does not specify any pleading standard, and causal elements do not
properly fall within the language of Rule 9(b), Rule 8(a)(2) must apply as
the proper pleading standard for the element of loss causation.182
2.

Supreme Court precedent and the implicit adoption of Rule 8(a)(2)
An additional factor suggesting that Rule 8(a)(2) is the proper pleading
standard for loss causation is the fact that the Supreme Court assumed,
even though it did not hold, that Rule 8(a)(2) governed loss causation in its
decision in Dura.183 The Court was clear that it would assume that ―neither
the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any special further

175. See DOBBS, supra note 169, § 181, at 445 (explaining that proximate cause is a
causal connection that is aimed at expressing a value judgment about a defendant‘s behavior
and the appropriate scope of the defendant‘s exposure to liability for that behavior).
176. Id. § 180, at 443.
177. See id. § 182, at 447–48 (noting that proximate cause is distinct from negligence
because the former can only arise after the latter has been identified).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (emphasis added).
182. See supra Part I.A.2.
183. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (citing
Rule 8 in dismissing plaintiff‘s case for failure to state a claim).
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requirement‖ with respect to pleading loss causation.184 The mention of a
―special further requirement‖ suggests that the Court drew a distinction
between the standard that it used to dismiss this case with the further
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA.185 If the Court
made clear that it would use neither Rule 9(b) nor the PSLRA as the
pleading standard, then the only remaining pleading standard is Rule
8(a)(2). While the Ninth Circuit is correct in explaining that the Supreme
Court did not directly rule on the issue of what pleading standard is
required for loss causation,186 the Court made a significant, if only implicit,
embrace of Rule 8(a)(2) as the proper standard by using it as the basis for
its substantive conclusions.187
Adding weight to this implicit adoption of Rule 8(a)(2) is the Fifth
Circuit‘s analysis recognizing the consistent line of progression from
Conley through Dura to Twombly.188 The Twombly Court itself suggested
that the notion of plausibility was implicit in its reasoning in Dura.189
There, the Court emphasized that in Dura, it ―explained that something
beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged . . . .‖190
Thus, if Dura is the jurisprudential genesis of the plausibility requirement,
it stands to reason that the plausibility standard under Rule 8(a)(2),
conceived of in Dura (a loss causation case) and refined in Twombly and
Iqbal, is the same standard that ought to apply to all subsequent loss
causation cases.191
3. Common law elements of fraud and the statutorily created element of
loss causation
Finally, loss causation, though analogous to causal elements under the
common law such as proximate cause, is not one of the common law
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. See Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
187. See Dura Pharm, Inc., 544 U.S. at 346, 348 (assuming Rule 8(a)(2) as the proper
pleading standard while dismissing plaintiff‘s claim).
188. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255–57 (5th Cir. 2009)
(describing an emerging plausibility standard implied by Rule 8(a)(2) from Conley to
Twombly).
189. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (recognizing Dura as
a source of the concept of plausibility and that insufficient claims should be cut off at the
earliest point).
190. Id. at 557–58 (citing Dura Pharm, Inc., 544 U.S. at 347).
191. See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255 (discussing Dura and applying Twombly‘s reading of
Rule 8(a)(2) to the element of loss causation to require facially ―plausible‖ causation or
allegation of enough facts); McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111,
1113–14 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Iqbal‘s formulation of Rule 8(a)(2) to the element of loss
causation and emphasizing the requirement of sufficient factual allegations to create a
plausible causal connection).

JASON HAYCOCK 60.1

200

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:173

elements of a fraud claim in fact, so pleading standards designed to govern
common law claims of fraud should not control it.192 Rule 9(b) generally
applies only to the ―traditional‖ elements of a fraud claim. 193 Loss
causation is not one of the traditional elements of a fraud claim.194 Rather,
loss causation is a statutorily created element of a securities fraud claim,195
and the statute that created the element, the PSLRA, does not specify which
pleading standard should apply.196 Thus, not being a common law element
of fraud, Rule 9(b) would not control the pleading standard for loss
causation, thereby leaving Rule 8(a)(2) as the governing pleading standard.
B. Pleading Loss Causation Under Iqbal‘s Formulation of Rule 8(a)(2)
Will Create a Higher Standard for a Plaintiff to Meet than Pleading Under
Rule 9(b) Because Rule 8(a)(2) Requires that a Private Securities Fraud
Claim Must Meet Plausibility as Well as Particularity
It is not yet clear the degree to which Twombly and Iqbal altered general
pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2).197 It is at least clear that the
Twombly Court intended the scrutiny of plausibility to be something more
than mere ―possibility.‖198 Further, Iqbal may be a higher pleading
standard in some contexts than what the Twombly Court originally
envisioned because the formalized two-step analysis begins by removing
certain ―conclusory‖ recitals from consideration under the plausibility

192. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(4) (2006)
(creating the requirement that a plaintiff prove the element of loss causation); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 22, § 1297, at 60–71 (outlining the traditional common law elements of
fraud and Rule 9(b)‘s applicability to those elements but omitting the element of loss
causation from the list).
193. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1297, at 56.
194. Id. at 60–70.
195. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4) (creating the requirement that a
plaintiff prove the element of loss causation).
196. See id. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(B)(1)(B) codified at 15 U.S.C
§ 78u-4(b)(1), (b)(4) (applying, specifically, the heightened pleading standard of
particularity to averments of misstatements and omissions, but remaining silent on the
element of loss causation).
197. See Bone, supra note 67, at 867–83 (arguing that Iqbal significantly heightened the
Twombly plausibility pleading standard through the alteration of the ―conclusory
statements‖ analysis); Hatamyar, supra note 37, at 596–625 (2010) (providing an interesting
and novel empirical analysis of the increase in the rate at which courts have granted motions
to dismiss from Conley through Twombly to Iqbal and suggesting the demise of notice
pleading). But see Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063,
1098 (2009) (arguing that the Twombly ―plausibility standard does not represent a deviation
from traditional notice pleading‖).
198. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that the plausibility
standard does not require a probabilistic analysis, but holding that sheer possibility is
insufficient); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (distinguishing between
what is possible and what is plausible and requiring the latter).
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analysis.199
Isolating and removing from the plausibility analysis
allegations deemed to be ―conclusory‖ could create a more difficult
standard for a plaintiff to meet because he will not have the benefit of those
recitals
when
a
court
passes
on his claim‘s overall plausibility.200
In pleading loss causation,
notwithstanding the fact that Rule 9(b) is not the proper pleading standard,
Iqbal‘s two prong formulation of plausibility may actually encompass Rule
9(b) particularity pleading in the first prong, and go further to require
plausibility in the second prong.
1.

The first prong of the Iqbal analysis is functionally equivalent to Rule
9(b)‟s particularity requirement
The Iqbal Court actually strengthened the pleading standard set out in
Twombly by formalizing the plausibility analysis through a two-prong
approach.201 This is accomplished primarily through the Iqbal Court‘s
application of the first prong.202 The first prong requires the reviewing
court to search out and identify claims that are deemed too ―conclusory‖
and eliminate them from the plausibility analysis as nothing more than
―[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.‖203 Once
eliminated, these ―conclusory‖ statements are effectively removed from
consideration under the actual plausibility analysis in the second prong.204
Thus, the plausibility analysis is ultimately applied to a redacted version of
the original complaint.205 In such a context, it is easy to see how a claim
that might otherwise seem plausible when considered as a whole

199. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the
majority‘s approaching ―conclusory‖ statements in isolation rather than within the context
of the complaint as a whole); see also Bone, supra note 67, at 859–62 (characterizing
Iqbal‟s first prong as problematic, especially because Iqbal provides no guidance where
―classification of allegations as legal conclusions can be decisive,‖ and agreeing with
Souter‘s opinion that factual allegations can be specific when read in the context of a
complaint as a whole).
200. Contra Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–62 (reading Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ standard
to implicitly require factual plausibility when considered in the context of the complaint as a
whole).
201. See Bone, supra note 67, at 870–79 (arguing that Iqbal‘s formal two-prong
approach sets up a ―thick screening model‖ that is more discriminating in its evaluation of a
pleading‘s sufficiency than Twombly‘s ―thin screening model‖ approach).
202. Id. at 859–60 (discussing the inevitable condemnation of claims deemed to be
conclusory).
203. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
204. See Bone, supra note 67, at 861–62 (finding that Iqbal‘s first prong is decisive and
does ―all the work‖).
205. Id. Contra Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564–65 (analyzing the complaint as a whole in
determining that certain claims were too conclusory).
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(conclusory statements and all), is considered implausible when selectively
analyzed after the first prong‘s hollowing effect on the complaint.206
In Twombly, the Court claimed that it was not expanding the heightened
factual particularity requirements under Rule 9(b) to all civil litigation.207
In Iqbal, however, the Court stated that to show facial plausibility, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient ―factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.‖208 The Iqbal Court
emphasized the requirement of pleading sufficient ―factual content to
nudge [the plaintiff‘s] claim . . . across the line from conceivable to
plausible‖209 in developing the first prong of the formal two-prong
analysis.210
Justice Souter, who authored Twombly, dissented in Iqbal, calling the
analysis a misapplication of Twombly and arguing that the factual
allegations that the Court dismissed as ―conclusory‖ should not have been
read in isolation.211 Rather, the statements should be read in the context of
the complaint as a whole.212 While Twombly utilized the ―conclusory‖
language in its analysis,213 the distinction, as Justice Souter noted, is that
the Twombly court interpreted the complaint as a whole and only excluded
from the analysis those statements that were conclusory restatements of
conduct alleged elsewhere in the complaint that did not add anything
factually new to the complaint.214 In contrast, Iqbal began by utilizing the

206. See Bone, supra note 67, at 861–62 (explaining how the first prong essentially does
all of the work so that what factual matter remains is likely to appear implausible if not
considered within the context of the complaint as a whole).
207. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing the Twombly language and reiterating the point
that ―detailed factual allegations‖ are not required for the Rule 8 pleading standard);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that a pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) ―does not need detailed
factual allegations.‖).
208. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 1952 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
210. See id. at 1949–52 (outlining a two-prong approach that begins with the
identification and dismissal of any ―conclusory‖ statements, and then moves to a plausibility
analysis of the remaining factual claims); see also Bone, supra note 67, at 851 (―Twombly
uses plausibility to screen only for truly meritless suits, but Iqbal uses it to screen for weak
lawsuits too.‖).
211. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
examining claims in isolation rather than within the context of the complaint as a whole).
212. Id.; see Bone, supra note 67, at 861–62 (critiquing the use of the first prong to
isolate and eliminate certain claims).
213. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57 (―[A] conclusory allegation of agreement at some
unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.‖).
214. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mere
recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not entitle the plaintiff to the assumption
that those statements are true, but that those statement ought to be evaluated within the
context of the whole complaint); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 (examining the claim in its
entirety); see also Bone, supra note 67, at 861–62 (discussing the two distinct approaches of
the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal).
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first prong to eliminate from the plausibility analysis any statements
deemed to be conclusory, and then used the second prong to apply the
plausibility analysis to what remained.215
It is problematic that the Court provided no clarity regarding how to
apply the first prong.216 Rather than provide criteria for assessing which
statements are conclusory, the Iqbal Court simply states that certain claims
just are conclusory.217 Without guidance, it is difficult to discern what a
fatal assertion of a legal conclusion is, and what a proper assertion of a fact
is218
because
the
distinction
between
the
two is likely to turn on their relative degree of specificity
or particularity.219 Therefore, it may be that properly pleading plausibility
entails that the complaint‘s factual recitals be particularly pled so as to pass
the scrutiny of Iqbal‘s conclusory analysis in the first prong.220
The conclusory analysis essentially utilizes concepts similar to
those that underlie Rule 9(b)—a plaintiff cannot simply state the
element of a claim without a sufficiently particularized factual
underpinning.221 The rhetorical similarities between the first prong of the
plausibility analysis under Rule 8(a)(2) and the particularity requirement
215. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–52 (asserting that the two-pronged approach
conformed with and clarified Twombly); Bone, supra note 67, at 859–62 (interpreting the
Iqbal court to have found ―some defect or deficiency intrinsic to the allegation itself‖ and
repeating Souter‘s argument that allegations that appear generalized and formulaic can gain
specificity when read in context). But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564–65 (analyzing the
complaint as a whole without the formal two-prong approach).
216. See Bone, supra note 67, at 859–60 (criticizing the Court for its lack of clarity
regarding the proper application of the first prong).
217. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (―It is the conclusory nature of respondent‘s
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the
presumption of truth.‖); Bone, supra note 67, at 859 (highlighting the fact that the Court
failed to provide guidance on how to determine whether an allegation is conclusory or not).
218. See Bone, supra note 67, at 864 (gathering from Walter Wheeler Cook‘s legal
realist critique of pleading the proposition that the ―distinction between legal conclusions
and factual allegations is necessarily a matter of degree rather than in kind, and in particular
depends on the degree of factual specificity.‖ (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, „Facts‟ and
„Statements of Fact‟, 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 242–44 (1936)).
219. Id.
220. Contra Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that a pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) ―does
not need detailed factual allegations.‖) (emphasis added); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing to
the Twombly language and reiterating the point that ―detailed factual allegations‖ are not
required); CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, 242–43 (2d ed.
1947) (deeming, as the chief architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as an
improvement the fact that the Federal Rules avoided the code distinction between factual
and legal conclusions by refraining from using the term ―fact‖ in a simplified pleading rule).
221. Compare WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, § 1297, at 152, 160 (―A pleading that
simply avers the technical elements of fraud without providing any showing that a factual
relationship exists between the defendant . . . and the . . . conduct does not have sufficient
informational content to satisfy [Rule 9(b)‘s] pleading-with-particularity requirement.‖),
with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (―Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.‖).
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under Rule 9(b) suggest that they may operate in the same way in certain
applications.222 Thus, there appears to be no meaningful distinction
between whether a plaintiff is required to plead ―factual particularity‖
under Rule 9(b) or sufficient ―factual content‖ under Rule 8(a)(2) to meet
the conclusory analysis of the first prong.223
The Eighth Circuit‘s approach in McAdams illustrates how the
distinction between legal conclusion and factual allegation is generally a
matter of specificity and is difficult to distinguish.224 The plaintiffs, who
invested a total of $11 million dollars in the defendant company, UCAP,225
alleged that the defendant made two statements that misrepresented its
overall financial condition.226 At a later date, the company revised those
statements to reflect the truth about the company‘s financial condition.227
The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to provide the value of
UCAP‘s stock either before, during, or after the announcements correcting
the previous misstatements.228 Without this crucial, but seemingly
elementary information, the court was able to call the plaintiffs‘ assertions
of loss causation conclusory, eliminate them from the analysis, and
ultimately deem the rest of the claim implausible.229 Had the plaintiffs
provided this crucial bit of information and provided more factual
particularity, it appears that the court would have been willing to let the
claim proceed. As the analysis does appear to turn simply on a matter of
factual particularity, this decision is consistent with Iqbal‘s stricture in its
first prong of analysis, requiring a claim to be pled at a certain level of
particularity lest it be deemed conclusory.230 Pleading particularity to meet
the requirements of Iqbal‘s first prong, however, is only the first step; the
particular factual recitals and legal assertions must also be plausible.231

222. Id.
223. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 473–77 (suggesting that Twombly‟s plausibility
standard inherently rejects a generalized pleading approach to the particularity requirement
of Rule 9(b) because ―[r]equiring specific facts that back up a conclusory allegation of
wrongdoing is the very definition of particularized pleading.‖).
224. See McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing how missing
facts affected the plausibility of the allegations).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1114.
227. Id. at 1114–15.
228. Id. at 1115.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Bone, supra note 67, at 864 (explaining that the distinction between
legal conclusion and factual assertion is a matter of particularity because statements of fact
―pitched at too high a level of generality‖ can so easily be interpreted as legal conclusions).
231. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (clarifying that while Rule
8(a)(2) might have relaxed the older system of code-pleading, it did not loosen the standard
so much as to allow a plaintiff to proceed only on conclusions, and further, that plausibility
is required to survive a motion to dismiss).
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2. Pleading loss causation under the second prong of the Iqbal analysis is
particularly difficult due to the complex nature of securities fraud claims
The plausibility analysis under Iqbal‘s second prong may pose a
particularly challenging standard in the loss causation context. This is due
to two factors: as a matter of logic, even if a claim is sufficiently
particular, it does not guarantee that it will be sufficiently plausible; and,
even assuming that a claim could be said to be ―plausible‖ in isolation, the
Supreme Court, in other contexts, has indicated a willingness to engage in a
type of ―plausibility in light of the alternatives‖ analysis where it could
look to alternative explanations of causation that are determined to be more
plausible than the plaintiff‘s theory.232
The Supreme Court called Rule 8(a)(2)‘s pleading requirements ―less
rigid‖ than a heightened pleading standard,233 but it is not clear that the
Iqbal gloss on Rule 8(a)(2) ensures that it remains ―less rigid‖ than Rule
9(b) in all situations.234 Regardless of what the Court claims is more or less
rigid, as a matter of logic, it seems nearly impossible (or at least
―implausible‖) to advance a plausible claim if it is not sufficiently
particular.235 Indeed, it would be difficult to find a claim plausible if that
claim did not also state particularities such that they would ―nudge [the
claim] . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible.‖236
While particularity may be necessary to stating a plausible claim, it is
unlikely to be sufficient. A claim can be adequately particular so as to
avoid being conclusory under Iqbal‘s first prong, but, for some other
reason, that claim is not sufficiently plausible under the second prong.
Moreover, in a loss causation context, the factual posture is generally such
that multiple factors potentially contribute to an individual‘s loss, thereby
augmenting the difficulty already inherent in the fact that pleading

232. See id. at 1951 (concluding that there was an ―obvious alternative explanation‖ to
the plaintiff‘s theory of liability) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 567
(2007) where the Court also found an ―obvious alternative explanation‖ to plaintiff‘s claim);
cf.
Tellabs,
Inc.
v.
Makor
Issues
&
Rights,
Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (requiring that properly pleading the element of scienter must be
―strong in light of other explanations . . . and at least as compelling as any [plausible]
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged‖).
233. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
234. See Bone, supra note 67, at 870–79 (disapproving of equating Iqbal and Twombly
where Iqbal‘s thick-screening approach eliminates weak suits while Twombly‘s thinscreening approach accepts weaker suits that at least suggest that ―something fishy might be
going on‖); Spencer, supra note 27, at 473–74 (equating plausibility pleading and
heightened particularity pleading).
235. Bone, supra note 67, at 870–79.
236. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (internal quotations omitted).
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particularity does not ensure plausibility as a matter of logic.237
Accordingly, it may be difficult to isolate a material misstatement or
omission as the cause of an economic loss if other economic factors also
contributed to that loss.238 Thus, even if a plaintiff could satisfy both
particularity and initial plausibility, the claim still may not be plausible in
light of alternative explanations.239
Looking at the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in a securities fraud cause
dealing with the element of scienter, Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues and
Rights, Ltd.,240 it may be that a plaintiff‘s pleading of loss causation must
not only be plausible, but at least as plausible as reasonable alternatives.241
Indeed, there is support for this approach in both Twombly and Iqbal.242
While the Iqbal Court does not go so far as to hold that ―plausibility‖ must
be determined in light of plausible alternatives, in dismissing his complaint,
the Court relied heavily on the notion that Iqbal‘s claim was unlikely, and
certainly not plausible in light of ―obvious alternative explanations.‖243
237. See Fisch, supra note 30, at 820–21, 845–46 (noting that a loss causation analysis is
particularly difficult in the securities fraud context because of the myriad factors that can
affect the valuation of a securities investment).
238. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (observing that
the link between share purchase price and consequent economic loss is not always strong
because there are a ―tangle of factors affecting price‖); see also Fisch, supra note 30, at 821
(noting that loss causation analysis can depend on how a plaintiff‘s loss is measured,
testimony of expert witnesses, and timing of price changes).
239. The concept of ―negative causation‖ provides some guidance here. It does not go to
a defendant‘s liability, but it provides the defendant with an affirmative defense in the
assessment of damages where the defendant can point to other factors that contributed to a
plaintiff‘s loss. It is a mitigation of damages scheme, and although it does not go to
liability, it shows that the idea that ―alternative‖ causes can factor into a plaintiff‘s loss and
that a defendant should not bear the full burden of liability in such circumstances is a wellunderstood concept in securities law. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2006) (allowing, for the purposes of mitigation of damages, a ―negative causation‖
affirmative defense in which a defendant offers alternative explanations for the plaintiff‘s
loss).
240. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
241. See id. at 323–24 (―To determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that give
rise to the requisite ‗strong inference‘ of scienter, a court must consider plausible,
nonculpable explanations . . . as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff . . . [that] must be
more than merely ‗reasonable‘ or ‗permissible‘—it must be cogent and compelling, thus
strong in light of other explanations.‖).
242. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951–52 (2009) (stating that ―[a]s between
that ‗obvious alternative explanation‘ for the arrests [that the plaintiff had been arrested not
because of his religion or race, but because he was part of a class of individuals who made
an attack on the United States], and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks
us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.‖ (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567(2007))). This suggests that the Court may be willing to look
to its seminal pleading case to find support for transporting a ―plausible in light of
alternatives,‖ Tellabs-type of analysis into the Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility test.
243. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52 (rejecting the plaintiffs‘ allegations of
discrimination in light of the Court‘s conclusion that a national security policy of detaining
individuals with suspected links to terrorism would naturally have a disparate effect on Arab
Muslims and therefore provides a more plausible explanation for plaintiff‘s detention).
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This at least opens the door for a ―plausibility in light of the alternative‖
style of analysis.
The Fourth Circuit‘s decision in In re Mutual Funds Investment
Litigation (a case decided under the particularity standard of Rule 9(b))
provides an apt example.244 There, the plaintiffs provided detailed factual
allegations regarding: (1) misstatements in the prospectuses of defendant
Janus Capital Group, Inc.; (2) subsequent disclosure that the statements
were false; (3) the payment of fines for the false statements, and; (4) the
ensuing decline in share price.245 The court concluded that these
allegations were a ―substantial cause‖ in the decrease in share price and
allowed the plaintiff to clear the particularity hurdle of Rule 9(b)‘s
heightened pleading.246 While these facts were sufficiently particular for
the court to find them to be a ―substantial cause‖ of the plaintiffs‘ injury, a
―substantial cause‖ of some injury does not necessarily mean that it is the
most plausible cause of the injury in light of alternate plausible
explanations.247 As the Dura Court alluded to, in a typical securities fraud
context, it is plausible that a myriad of other factors such as lower earnings
than expected, poor performance in a particular market sector, a decrease in
general consumer demand in China, or an act of God halfway across the
world could provide more plausible explanations for what ―caused‖ a given
loss.248 As discussed earlier, determining the exact cause of some event is a
difficult endeavor, but even determining an event‘s most plausible cause is
not much easier, particularly in the securities fraud context.249 In such a
situation, a plaintiff may be able to plead sufficient factual particularity to
meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)‘s particularity standard and even the
first prong of Iqbal‘s conclusory analysis under Rule 8(a)(2), yet still fail to
meet the second prong of Iqbal‘s analysis either because the factual
pleading is not plausible, or is not plausible in light of alternate plausible
explanations.250
244. In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation 566 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2009).
245. Id. at 128–29.
246. Id. at 128.
247. See id. (maintaining that allegations do not have to conclusively show that an injury
is caused solely by one action, only that it was a substantial cause).
248. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (noting that in a loss
causation context, a loss is susceptible to multiple and intervening factors); Law v. Medco
Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786–87 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing for failure to state loss
causation after finding no ground to doubt causation when plaintiffs failed to respond to
defendant‘s studies showing that because defendant‘s share price moved in tandem with
competitors‘ share price, market forces created plaintiff‘s loss); see also Fisch, supra note
30, at 840 (highlighting the difficulty of showing loss causation because of the many factors
that can affect the value of a securities investment).
249. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
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C. As a Policy Matter, Pleading Loss Causation under Iqbal‟s
Construction of Rule 8(a)(2), Combined with the Strict Pleading
Requirements for the other Elements of a Private Securities Fraud Claim,
Suggests that a Plaintiff Will Face a Substantial Barrier in Accessing
Judicial Redress
As a matter of congressional intent, requiring the element of loss
causation to be pled under a heightened standard is in line with Congress‘s
desire to curb abusive litigation practices in private securities fraud
claims.251 Pleading under Iqbal‘s plausibility standard, however, may
present policy concerns about a plaintiff‘s access to judicial remedy for loss
resulting from securities fraud.252 Placing the issue of pleading loss
causation within the broader context of pleading a private securities fraud
claim suggests that the heightened pleading standard may be too strong.
The entire pleading scheme for a private securities fraud claim operates
under a heightened standard. For example, section 21D(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act sets out the heightened pleading standard for the state of
mind element of scienter.253 A plaintiff must state factual particularity that
creates a strong inference that the defendant acted with scienter.254 The
Supreme Court has since interpreted ―strong inference‖ to be more than
simply what is reasonable; it must be at least as likely as reasonable
alternative inferences.255
When considering the combination of the PSLRA particularity pleading
requirements for the misstatement or material omission elements,256 the
Tellabs ―strong inference‖ requirement for scienter257, and the application
of Iqbal‘s formulation of plausibility to the remaining elements, including
loss causation,258 the plaintiff faces a significant burden in putting forward
251. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683;
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730–31 (describing legislative reforms, in line with the overall goal of securities laws, as
implementing ―needed procedural protections‖ to protect investors, innocent parties, and the
confidence in and integrity of the American securities market system).
252. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges presented by
a heightened pleading standard).
253. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)
(designating the pleading requirements for scienter, requiring a complaint to ―state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with required
state of mind‖).
254. Id.
255. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007).
256. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(1)(B).
257. Id.
258. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (clarifying that while Rule
8(a)(2) might have relaxed the older system of code-pleading, it did not loosen the standard
so much as to allow a plaintiff to proceed only on conclusions, and further, that plausibility
is required to survive a motion to dismiss).
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facts that can clear all of these procedural hurdles. Ultimately, there may
be legitimate concerns regarding system accessibility. The more difficult
that it becomes to adequately plead a private securities fraud claim, the less
likely an investor with a meritorious claim will be able to recover his losses
absent a clearly compelling case and the financial means to weather a storm
of motions to dismiss.259 Pleading loss causation under the Iqbal
plausibility gloss on Rule 8(a)(2), while perhaps jurisprudentially
consistent with the intentions of the PSLRA, only serves to augment the
concern about system accessibility.
CONCLUSION
The current economic climate suggests that a steady stream of private
securities fraud claims should enter the court system in the near term.
Understanding the proper pleading standard for the element of loss
causation will be pivotal for a plaintiff bringing a claim if he is to avoid
dismissal. Although the general pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) is the
proper pleading standard for the element of loss causation, it is likely a
difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet in light of Iqbal‘s new, formal twoprong approach.260
Several factors suggest that Rule 8(a)(2) is the proper pleading standard
for loss causation. While the Supreme Court did not formally adopt Rule
8(a)(2) as the pleading standard to govern loss causation in Dura, it clearly
assumed it as the standard in dismissing a claim for insufficiently pleading
the element of loss causation. Additionally, Dura begins a fairly clear line
of progression in the development of the plausibility pleading under Rule
8(a)(2) that is further refined in Twombly and Iqbal. The fact that the
Supreme Court cited Dura, a loss causation case, in Twombly and Iqbal as
a source of the current plausibility standard shows that Dura was an
integral case in the development of the Court‘s plausibility pleading
jurisprudence and strongly suggests that the Court would apply Rule
8(a)(2) to future loss causation cases. Moreover, analogies to the elements
of common law fraud and the element of proximate cause in the tort
context reinforce the conclusion that, notwithstanding the fact that Rule
9(b) generally governs the pleading standard for elements of a fraud claim,
Rule 8(a)(2) is the proper pleading standard.
However, properly pleading the element of loss causation may prove to
be particularly difficult under the Iqbal plausibility construction of Rule

259. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 471 (recognizing the irony that a plaintiff will often
be unable to plead a plausible claim absent discovery to key information necessary to do so).
260. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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8(a)(2). Iqbal‘s formal two-prong approach entails requirements of both
particularity and plausibility, and possibly even ―plausibility in light of
other reasonable alternatives.‖261 To meet Iqbal‘s first prong—avoiding
conclusory statements—a plaintiff will need to plead factual
particularity.262
To meet Iqbal‘s second prong, the plausibility
requirement, a plaintiff will need to plead a factual description of events
that are not only sufficiently particular to satisfy the first prong, but also
sufficiently plausible, and perhaps even the most plausible description of
events among reasonable alternatives.263 This pleading scheme suggests a
substantial burden for the plaintiff to carry at the pleadings stage.
Moreover, considering pleading the element of loss causation within the
context of the broader private securities fraud claim and the heightened
requirements therein, policy concerns arise regarding a plaintiff‘s ability to
access judicial remedy for loss. The cumulative effect is that there will
likely be many cases where a plaintiff with a meritorious, detailed, but not
clear-cut private securities fraud claim, will ultimately find himself
pleading a lost cause.

261. See discussion supra Part II.B.
262. See supra Part II.B.1.
263. See supra Part II.B.2.

